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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGo h'
and Elinor H. Hitt
This survey period' saw continued evolution of domestic relations law
through changes in legislation and case law.2 Legislation passed in the
2009 Session of the Georgia General Assembly took effect during this
survey period, and the Georgia Supreme Court continued to accept
nonfrivolous appeals in divorce cases, which provides guidance to those
interested in domestic relations law.
I.

PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS

During this survey period, the supreme court clarified which
prenuptial agreements are subject to section 19-3-63 of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.).' This statute provides in pertinent
part that "[elvery marriage contract in writing, made in contemplation
of marriage . .. must be attested by at least two witnesses." In Dove
v. Dove,' the supreme court determined that the trial court erred in
finding a prenuptial agreement unenforceable because it was not
attested by two witnesses.6 The trial court held that the agreement,
which addressed issues of alimony, was made in contemplation of
* Partner in the firm of Warner, Mayoue, Bates & McGough, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of California at Berkley (A.B., 1963; LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Warner, Mayoue, Bates & McGough, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993; M.S.W., 1996); Georgia State University College of
Law (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. This Survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2009 to May 31, 2010.
2. For an analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the prior survey period, see
Barry B. McGough & Elinor H. Hitt, Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
61 MERCER L. REV. 117 (2009).
3. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-63 (2010).
4. Id.
5. 285 Ga. 647, 680 S.E.2d 839 (2009).
6. Id. at 647, 680 S.E.2d at 840.
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marriage and subject to the dual attestation requirement in O.C.G.A.
§ 19-3-63.' On appeal, the supreme court held the trial court's determination was erroneous for two reasons.' First, it is well settled that
prenuptial agreements that address alimony issues "are made in
contemplation of divorce, not marriage. Further, the deftnitive criteria
articulated by the supreme court for lower courts to use in determining
whether a prenuptial agreement made in contemplation of divorce is
valid are as follows:
the party seeking enforcement bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that: (1) the antenuptial agreement was not the result of fraud,
duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of material facts;
(2) the agreement is not unconscionable; and (3) taking into account all
relevant facts and circumstances, including changes beyond the parties'
contemplation when the agreement was executed, enforcement of the
antenuptial agreement would be neither unfair nor unreasonable."o
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Lawrence," the wife challenged the
enforceability of the parties' prenuptial agreement because it was
The supreme court held that the
attested by only one witness.'
agreement in issue, which addressed alimony and referred to the
possibility of divorce, was a contract made in contemplation of divorce,
not in contemplation of marriage. 3 The court reasoned that a contract
made in contemplation of divorce "is not subject to the dual attestation
requirement of [O.C.G.A.] § 19-3-63."4
On the other hand, in Sullivan v. Sullivan," when faced with a
prenuptial agreement that did not address divorce or alimony but did
include language waiving each spouse's rights in the other's property
either before or after marriage, the supreme court determined that the
agreement was made in contemplation of marriage; therefore, the
agreement was subject to O.C.G.A. § 19-3-63."' However, the agreement in issue had only one witness and was rendered unenforceable

7. Id.
8. See id. at 647-51, 680 S.E.2d at 840-42.
9. Id. at 647, 680 S.E.2d at 840.
10. Id. at 650,680 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting Blige v. Blige, 283 Ga. 65,67,656 S.E.2d 822,
824 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641,
292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982)).
11. 286 Ga. 309, 687 S.E.2d 421 (2009).
12. Id. at 311, 687 S.E.2d at 423.
13. Id. at 311-12, 687 S.E.2d at 423-24.
14. Id. at 312, 687 S.E.2d at 424.
15. 286 Ga. 53, 684 S.E.2d 861 (2009).
16. Id. at 53-54, 684 S.E.2d at 862.
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because an unattested marriage contract is not effective between the
signatories."
In Lawrence the wife also challenged the enforceability of the
prenuptial agreement on a second basis." The wife argued there was
not complete disclosure of the husband's financial status as mandated
by the first prong of the three-part test articulated in Scherer v.
Scherer," which requires that "(1) the antenuptial agreement was not
the result of fraud, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure
It was undisputed that the wife never saw a
of material facts."
financial statement or any formal documentation before signing the
antenuptial agreement.s' The supreme court ultimately held that the
wife had sufficient knowledge of the husband's business dealings and
personal financial condition to support the trial court's ruling that there
was full and fair disclosure prior to the execution of the agreement."
However, the court noted "that attaching to the antenuptial agreement
financial statements showing both parties' assets, liabilities, and income,
while not necessary, 'is the most effective method of satisfying the
statutory [disclosure] obligation in most circumstances,' thereby
deterring protracted and expensive litigation if the antenuptial
agreement is later invoked."'
II.

PLEADINGS

In Ellis v. Ellis," the supreme court ruled against a woman who
argued the lower court erred in conducting the final hearing in her
divorce without her being present. 26 The husband filed for divorce in
June 2008. At the time, the wife acknowledged service of the husband's
complaint but was not represented by counsel and did not file any
response. The wife later retained counsel who filed an entry of
appearance but no responsive pleadings. The husband's attorney
notified the wife's attorney of the final hearing date, which was
continued, and depositions were set for February 2009. The wife's

17. Id. at 54, 684 S.E.2d at 862.
18. See Lawrence, 286 Ga. at 312-13, 687 S.E.2d at 424.
19. 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982).
20. Lawrence, 286 Ga. at 312,687 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting Blige v. Blige, 283 Ga. 65, 67,
656 S.E.2d 822, 824 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Scherer, 249 Ga. at
641, 292 S.E.2d at 666).
21. Id. at 313, 687 S.E.2d at 424.
22. Id. at 313-14, 687 S.E.2d at 425.
23. Id. at 313, 687 S.E.2d at 424 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Blige v. Blige, 283 Ga. 65, 69 n.12, 656 S.E.2d 822, 826 n.12 (2008)).
24. 286 Ga. 625, 690 S.E.2d 155 (2010).
25. Id. at 625, 690 S.E.2d at 156.
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attorney later testified that the husband's attorney agreed to give him
notice of the final hearing once it was scheduled by the court.'
Prior to the depositions, a new attorney entered an appearance on
behalf of the husband and "moved the trial court to enter a final
judgment of divorce on the pleadings without holding an evidentiary
hearing."' After the trial court granted the husband's motion, the wife
filed a motion for new trial, relying on the supposed agreement made by
the husband's first attorney to provide the wife notice of the date of any
final hearing. The trial court denied the motion, finding that notwithstanding any outside agreement between the parties' counsel, the wife
waived notice by failing to file a response.' The wife appealed.2 9
Generally, "[wihen a defendant in a divorce action fails to file
defensive pleadings, the divorce is, by definition, uncontested. Failure
to file defensive pleadings constitutes waiver of notice of the hearing on
the final decree."' Further, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(a)" provides that
the failure of a party to file pleadings in an action shall be deemed to
be a waiver by him or her of all notices, including notices of time and
place of trial and entry of judgment, and all service in the action,
except service of pleadings asserting new or additional claims for
relief."
The supreme court held that the wife waived any final hearing notice in
this case and that the trial court did not err in denying the wife's motion
for new trial."
III. CHILD CUSTODY
In Mongerson v. Mongerson," following entry of the final judgment
and decree of divorce, the husband appealed the trial court's ruling in
part, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting him
"from exposing the children to his homosexual partners and friends."'
Public policy in Georgia encourages divorced parents to participate in

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 625-26, 690 S.E.2d at 156-57.
29. See id. at 625, 690 S.E.2d at 156.
30. Id. at 626,690 S.E.2d at 157 (alteration in original) (quoting Hardwick v. Hardwick,
245 Ga. 570, 571, 266 S.E.2d 184, 185 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
32. Id.; Ellis, 286 Ga. at 626, 690 S.E.2d at 157.
33. Ellis, 286 Ga. at 627, 690 S.E.2d at 157-58.
34. 285 Ga. 554, 678 S.E.2d 891 (2009).
35. Id. at 555, 678 S.E.2d at 894 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the raising of their children." At the same time, a trial court may, at
its discretion, terminate the visitation rights of a noncustodial parent in
the presence of certain individuals if the evidence shows that exposure
to the prohibited individuals would have an adverse affect on the
children or that the children were exposed to inappropriate conduct
involving the individuals specified." In this case, the supreme court
held there was no evidence in the record that any member of the gay
and lesbian community "ha[d] engaged in inappropriate conduct in the
presence of the children or that the children would be adversely affected
by exposure to any member of that community."" The supreme court
further held that the trial court's "prohibition against contact with any
gay or lesbian person acquainted with [the hiusband assumes, without
evidentiary support, that the children will suffer harm from any such
contact" and that "[sluch an arbitrary classification based on sexual
orientation ffies in the face of our public policy" and therefore is an
abuse of discretion.39

W. CHILD SUPPORT
Effective September 1, 2009, the child support guidelines found in
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15' were amended to include cost of life insurance as
a deviation subtracted from or added to the presumptive amount of child
support."' The guidelines were further amended as they relate to a
If a
noncustodial parent's request for a low-income deviation.42
noncustodial parent requests such a deviation from his or her presumptive child support obligation, that "parent shall demonstrate no earning
capacity or that his or her pro rata share of the presumptive amount of
child support would create an extreme economic hardship for such
parent." In considering this request, the fact finder "shall examine
all attributable and excluded sources of income, assets, and benefits
available to the noncustodial parent and may consider all reasonable
expenses of the noncustodial parent."" Among other things, the fact
finder shall also consider "the relative hardship that a reduction in the

36. Id.; see O.C.GA § 19-9-3(d) (2010).
37. Mongerson, 285 Ga. at 555, 678 S.E.2d at 894.
38. Id. at 556, 678 S.E.2d at 894-95.
39. Id. at 556, 678 S.E.2d at 895.
40. O.C.GA § 19-6-15 (2010).
41. Ga. H.R. Bill 145, § 2, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 96-97 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 19-615(bX8)).
42. Id. at § 4, 2009 Ga. Laws at 97 (codified at O.C.GA. § 19-6-15(i)(2XB)).
43. Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 19-6-15(iX2XBXi)).
44. Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(ix2XBXii)).
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amount of child support paid to the custodial parent would have on the
custodial parent's household.""
Both the Georgia Court of Appeals and the Georgia Supreme Court
dealt with issues related to child support during this survey period. In
Grenevitch v. Grenevitch," the supreme court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the former husband's petition to modify child support.'
The parties were divorced in December 2007 pursuant to a final
judgment and divorce decree that incorporated the parties' settlement
agreement. Under the divorce decree, the husband was required to pay
This
$1,614.70 per month in child support for his four children.'
obligation would continue
until such time as the youngest minor child dies, marries, enters the
military, attains the age of eighteen, or is otherwise emancipated,
whichever first occurs; provided, however, that in the event that any of
the minor children turn 18 years of age while still in high school, [the
husband's] child support obligations shall continue for that child until
such time as the child graduates from high school, but in no event to
extend past the child's twentieth birthday.4'
The husband filed a complaint to modify his child support obligation,
alleging that the parties' eldest child had turned eighteen and that his
obligation to pay child support for the child had ceased, and his former
wife filed a motion to dismiss. At the hearing on the wife's motion, the
husband's counsel pointed out that one of the children turned eighteen
and was not in high school any longer. However, the trial court
dismissed the husband's complaint.'
The supreme court noted that "[a] motion to dismiss should not be
granted unless the averments in the complaint disclose with certainty
that a party 'would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that
could be proven in support of the claim."' Thus, the trial court erred
in dismissing the husband's complaint without allowing him to present
If the trial court had allowed the husband to present
evidence.
evidence showing that the eldest child had turned eighteen and was no
longer in high school, then "a state of facts could have been proven that

45. Id (codified at O.C.GA § 19-6-15(iX2XBXiii)).
46. 285 Ga. 509, 678 S.E.2d 87 (2009).
47. Id. at 509, 678 S.E.2d at 88.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 509-10, 678 S.E.2d at 88.
50. Id. at 510, 678 S.E.2d at 88-89.
51. Id. at 509,678 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting Ledford v. Meyer, 249 Ga. 407,408,290 S.E.2d
908, 909 (1982)).
52. Id. at 510, 678 S.E.2d at 89.
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would have ended [the hiusband's obligation to pay child support for the
eldest child who had turned eighteen

...

and was no longer in high

school."
In 'Iurnerv. Trner,' the parties reached agreement on all issues in
their divorce action except child support and division of extracurricular
expenses. These two issues were submitted to the trial court for
determination. After an in-chambers conference, the trial court entered
a final judgment and decree of divorce, which ordered the husband to
pay $552.09 in monthly child support and two-thirds of the expenses for
the children's extracurricular activities."
The husband appealed the trial court's ruling regarding extracurricular expenses. He argued that the trial court's ruling required him to pay
the costs of extracurricular expenses twice because the costs were
included in the presumptive child support amount.56 The supreme
court noted that "the basic child support obligation is intended to cover
average amounts of special expenses for raising children, including the
cost of extracurricular activities."" When the special expenses involved
"exceed[] seven percent of the basic child support obligation, the
'additional amount of special expenses shall be considered ... a
deviation . . .' [and] included in Schedule E of the Child Support

Worksheet." 8
Instead of making a provision in Schedule E for a special expenses
deviation, the trial court apportioned the entire cost of extracurricular
expenses between the parties, which is prohibited under O.C.G.A. § 19-615(i)(2)(J)(ii).5" Therefore, the trial court erred in making a separate
child support award, and its judgment was reversed on appeal by the
supreme court.'
In Henry v. Beacham,s" the court of appeals considered the validity
of a court-ordered child support trust.? Following the entry of a final
judgment of paternity and legitimation, the trial court found the father's
gross monthly income was $49,583.33 and ordered that $9000 be

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 510, 678 S.E.2d at 88-89.
285 Ga. 866, 684 S.E.2d 596 (2009).
Id. at 866, 684 S.E.2d at 597.
Id. at 867, 684 S.E.2d at 598.
Id.; see O.C.GA § 19-6-15(ix2XJXii).
Turner,285 Ga. at 867-68,684 S.E.2d at 598; see also O.C.G.A.
Turner, 285 Ga. at 868, 684 S.E.2d at 598.
Id.
301 Ga. App. 160, 686 S.E.2d 892 (2009).
Id. at 160-61, 686 S.E.2d at 893.

§ 19-6-15(iX2XJ)(ii).
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deducted from his paychecks during football season' to fulfill an
annual child support obligation of $36,000. The trial court also directed
the father to establish a $250,000 trust to fund future child support
payments in the event that he failed to pay child support as ordered.'
The father appealed, "arguling] that the child support guidelines codified
in [O.C.G.A.] § 19-6-15 do not authorize" the trial court to create a trust
in addition to monthly child support payments.6
In upholding the trial court's ruling, the court of appeals pointed out
that the child support guidelines allow the trial court to deviate from the
guidelines when the trial court determines that a deviation is in the best
interest of the children.' The language of the statute "directs that a
court applying the guidelines 'shall not abrogate its responsibility in
making the final determination of child support based on the evidence
presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial.'" 7 The court of
appeals also noted that the supreme court has historically given the trial
courts "wide latitude" in "fashioning support awards" by approving
"lump sum child support payments and the creation of trust funds for
future payments . . ., even though the guidelines in force at the time did

not expressly provide for such payment structures."
In James-Dickens v. Petit-Compere," the trial court denied the
mother's request for a contempt hearing regarding the father's failure to
pay child support pursuant to a temporary protective order. The trial
court rejected the mother's request on the ground that the twelve-month
protective order would expire before the hearing date. The mother
appealed.o
The child support order was initially entered pursuant to O.C.GA.
§ 19-13-4(a)," which provides the process for entering protective
orders." The statute governing continuing enforceability of child
support orders, O.C.G.A. § 19-6-17(e)," provides that "[amny payment
or installment of support under any child support order is, on and after

63. The father was a professional football player "with the Denver Broncos of the
National Football League." Id. at 161, 686 S.E.2d at 894.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 162, 686 S.E.2d at 894.
66. Id. at 163, 686 S.E.2d at 895; see also O.C.GA § 19-6-15(cX1).
67. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(d); Henry, 301 Ga. App. at 163, 686 S.E.2d at 895.
68. Henry, 301 Ga. App. at 164, 686 S.E.2d at 895 (referring to cases that arose under
the former version of the child support guidelines).
69. 299 Ga. App. 519, 683 S.E.2d 83 (2009).
70. Id. at 519, 683 S.E.2d at 84.
71. O.C.G.A. § 19-13-4(a) (2010).
72. James-Dickens, 299 Ga. App. at 519, 683 S.E.2d at 84.
73. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-17(e) (2010).
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the date due: (1) [a] judgment by operation of law, with the full force and
effect and attributes of a judgment of this state, including the ability to
be enforced."" Thus, even though the child support was awarded
pursuant to a temporary rather than permanent order, each child
support installment is itself an enforceable order.7 5
Further, the court of appeals has previously held that in a civil
contempt proceeding, the trial court does not have the "authority to
modify the terms of a child support order," and "a trial court may not
forgive any child support in arrears." For these reasons, the court of
appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded the matter
for further proceedings.
V. ALIMoNY

During the survey period, the supreme court ruled on several
questions related to alimony awards, including proper venue, factors to
be considered, and evidence required to support an award. In Parrisv.
Douthit," the court reiterated the current law that absent a valid
waiver, "proper venue in an alimony-modification action is the county of
residence of the ... defendant in the modification action."79 In
December 2008 the parties divorced in Cobb County. The former wife,
Parris, filed a contempt action in Cobb County on February 12, 2009.
Afterward, Douthit, Parris's former husband, filed a petition for alimony
modification, which was also filed in Cobb County. Parris answered the
modification action by special appearance and moved to dismiss the
action. Parris argued that because she had become a resident of
Cherokee County, the venue was improper. The trial court denied her
motion and temporarily modified Douthit's alimony obligation.'
On appeal, after holding that proper venue in an alimony modification
is the county in which the defendant in the modification action resides,
the supreme court articulated two ways in which venue can be conferred
by consent."1 First, venue can be waived by conduct if a defendant fails
to raise the defense through responsive pleadings or by motion. 82

74. James-Dickens, 299 Ga. App. at 519-20, 683 S.E.2d at 84.
75. Id. at 520, 683 S.E.2d at 85; see O.C.G.A. § 19-6-17(e)(1).
76. James-Dickens, 299 Ga. App. at 520,683 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Ga. Dep't of Human
Res. v. Gamble, 297 Ga. App. 509, 510, 677 S.E.2d 713, 715 (2009)).
77. Id. at 520, 683 S.E.2d at 85.
78. 287 Ga. 119, 694 S.E.2d 655 (2010).
79. Id. at 119, 694 S.E.2d at 656 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 259 Ga. 151, 151, 377 S.E.2d
850, 850 (1989)); GA. CONST. of 1983, art. VI, § 2, para. 6.
80. Parris,287 Ga. at 119, 694 S.E.2d at 656.
81. Id. at 120, 694 S.E.2d at 656-57.
82. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(hXl) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
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Second, venue can also be waived "where the defendant voluntarily,
clearly and specifically, by affidavit, waives any objection to venue."
Here, Parris did not waive venue by either conduct or written
affidavit." Even though Douthit argued, and the trial court found,
that Parris orally consented to venue, her consent was neither in writing
nor transcribed, and such alleged oral consent is not sufficiently
comparable to the waivers the court of appeals has previously approved.' Thus, the trial court's judgment was reversed."
In Sprouse v. Sprouse," the husband appealed the trial court's
alimony determination, arguing that the trial court improperly
considered the length of time the parties lived together prior to
marriage. The parties entered into a common law marriage in Alabama
in 1996, which was terminated by a divorce decree in 2001. Soon after
their 2001 divorce, the parties resumed cohabitation and on March 5,
2005, were ceremonially married. On January 2, 2007, the husband
filed a divorce action."
Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a final divorce decree
and awarded the wife alimony for approximately thirteen years in
varying amounts." The trial court stated that the parties "have been
together for 13 years and she doesn't appear to have anything. rm going
to do [it] that way and then it stops."
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(a)91 articulates factors relevant to the determination of alimony." When the husband argued that "palimony"9" is not
recognized in Georgia, the trial court explained that while the length of
the marriage is one factor to be considered, it is not dispositive." The
finder of fact has "broad discretion to consider '[sluch other relevant
factors as the court deems equitable and proper."' In looking to case
law from other jurisdictions, the supreme court held "that[] under the
catchall provision of [O.C.G.A.] § 19-6-5(a)(8), the trial 'court is free to
83. Parris,287 Ga. at 120, 694 S.E.2d at 657.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 120, 694 S.E.2d at 656-57.
86. Id. at 120, 694 S.E.2d at 657.
87. 285 Ga. 468, 678 S.E.2d 328 (2009).
88. Id. at 468, 678 S.E.2d at 329.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 469, 678 S.E.2d at 329-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(a) (2010).
92. Id.
93. Palimony is a court-ordered allowance paid by one member to the other of an
unmarried couple that formerly cohabitated. BIACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (9th ed. 2009).
94. Sprouse, 285 Ga. at 469-70, 678 8.E.2d at 330.
95. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(aX8); Sprouse, 285 Ga. at 470, 678 S.E.2d at 330 (alteration in
original).
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consider the parties' entire relationship, including periods of premarital
cohabitation,' in determining alimony.'"
In Coker v. Coker," the husband was ordered to pay the wife $36,500
lump sum alimony within three-and-a-half months following a bench
trial.'
The husband appealed. The undisputed evidence at trial
showed the marital estate was a mobile home, appraised several years
prior for $ 4 000," and that the husband's separate estate consisted of
an 8.34% interest in a family-owned limited liability company," which
could not be converted or transferred to cash, and $500 a week in income
from his employment.or
While the finder of fact is usually given wide latitude in determining
the alimony amount to be paid,102 "[O.C.GA.] § 19-6-1(c) provides that
alimony is to be awarded in accordance with the needs of the party to
whom it is awarded and with the ability of the other party to pay.""os
In determining the trial court's award of lump sum alimony to the wife
to be erroneous, the supreme court held there was no evidence that the
husband had the financial ability to pay the amount as ordered.10o
VI.

DIVIsIoN OF PROPERTY

During this survey period, the supreme court faced cases involving
division of military retirement benefits and stock options, transmutation
of separate property into marital property, and several cases regarding
modification of final judgments and divorce decrees. In Michel v.
Michel," the trial court denied the wife an interest in the husband's
The trial
military retirement benefits pursuant to their divorce."
court found that because the parties had been married less than ten

96. Sprouse, 285 Ga. at 470, 678 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932
P.2d 247, 250 (Alaska 1997)). Cf Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977)
(holding that when plaintiff brought an action to recover the money she invested in a house
with defendant and the comparable value of the services she rendered him during eighteen
years of cohabitation, the fact that the parties were unmarried while cohabitating
constituted immoral consideration that barrred plaintiff from recovery).
97. 286 Ga. 20, 685 S.E.2d 70 (2009).
98. Id. at 20-21, 685 S.E.2d at 70-71.
99. Id. at 20-21, 685 S.E.2d at 70.
100. Id. at 20, 685 S.E.2d at 70. The LLC's sole asset was a 154-acre parcel of land
with an appraised value of $1.2 million. Id.
101. Id. at 21, 685 S.E.2d at 71.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 262 Ga. 872,873, 426 S.E.2d 857,859 (1993)); see
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-1(c) (2010).
104. Coker, 286 Ga. at 22-23, 685 S.E.2d at 72.
105. 286 Ga. 892, 692 S.E.2d 381 (2010).
106. Id. at 893, 692 8.E.2d at 382.
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years, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2),' 7 it was without authority
to award the wife an interest in the husband's military retirement
account.'"
The wife appealed, arguing that the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act (Act),'" which encompasses § 1408(d)(2),
"affirmatively grants state courts the power to treat military retirement
benefits as marital property that is subject to equitable division upon a
divorce.""o The Act was passed by Congress directly in response to
McCarty v. McCarty,"' "in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that federal statutes governing military retirement pay
prevented state courts from treating such pay as marital property that
is divisible upon divorce."112 Subsequently, the Supreme Court held
that "[it is clear from both the language of the [Act], and its legislative
history, that Congress sought to change the legal landscape created by
the McCarty decision.""
The Act provides a direct payment mechanism that requires the
federal government to "make direct payments to a former spouse who
presents .. . a state-court order granting her a portion of the military
However, "only a
retiree's disposable retired or retainer pay.""
former spouse who was married to a military member 'for a period of 10
years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of
service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired ...
pay[]'. . . is eligible to receive direct .. . payments.""n
The Georgia Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in
finding that the ten-year requirement of § 1408(d)(2) prevented the trial
court from awarding a portion of the husband's military retirement pay
to the wife." 6 The requirement limits the direct payment mechanism,
but it does not limit the state court's power to determine that military

107. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(dX2) (2006).
108. Michel, 286 Ga. at 893, 692 S.E.2d at 382.
109. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).
110. Michel, 286 Ga. at 893, 692 S.E.2d at 382; see 10 U.S.C. § 1408(cX1).
111. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
112. Michel, 286 Ga. at 893, 692 S.E.2d at 382.
113. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. at 894, 692 S.E.2d at 382 (quoting Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 585
(1989)); see 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d).
115. Michel, 286 Ga. at 894, 692 S.E.2d at 382 (citations omitted) (quoting Mansell v.
Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 585 (1989)); see 10 U.S.C. § 1408(dX2).
116. Michel, 286 Ga. at 894, 692 S.E.2d at 382-83.
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retirement benefits are marital property and therefore subject to
equitable division."7
In Newman v. Patton,"' the former wife had 140,750 stock options
from her employer when the parties married on September 1, 2002.
Some of the options vested prior to the marriage, and some vested
during the marriage. In the final divorce decree, the trial court found
that the wife's premarital stock options that vested during the marriage
were marital property and awarded the husband an equitable share."9
Relying on Virginia case law," the trial court opined that the stock
options were marital property because they were similar to deferred
compensation and had vested during the marriage.' 2 ' The wife

appealed.122
In Georgia, "property is subject to equitable division if it is acquired
as a direct result of the labor and investments of the parties during the
marriage.""
Based on this principle, the supreme court concluded
that the trial court should have determined whether vesting of the
previously awarded stock directly resulted from the parties' investments
and labor during their marriage." If it did, then the stock options
were marital property."
If it did not, then they were the wife's

separate property.126

In making this inquiry and in any subsequent decision regarding
equitable division, trial courts should consider factors such as the
following:
whether the marital or premarital funds were used to exercise the
options; the employer's purpose for granting the option. . .; the best
formula for apportioning the marital share of the options based on the
purpose and timing of the options in relation to the time of the
marriage; a method of distribution to [the spouse who was not granted
stock options]; and the parties' tax obligations resulting from distribu.tion.127

117. Id. at 894, 692 S.E.2d at 383.
118. 286 Ga. 805, 692 S.E.2d 322 (2010).
119. Id. at 805-06, 692 S.E.2d at 323.
120. See Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
121. Newman, 286 Ga. at 805-06, 692 S.E.2d at 323.
122. Id. at 805, 692 S.E.2d at 323.
123. Id. at 806, 692 S.E.2d at 323 (quoting Payson v. Payson, 274 Ga. 231, 232, 552
S.E.2d 839, 841 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 806-07, 692 S.E.2d at 324.
125. Id. at 807, 692 S.E.2d at 324.
126. Id.
127. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The supreme court held that the trial court erred in concluding without
any further analysis that because the previously awarded stock options
vested during the marriage, the options were a marital asset. 128
In Coe v. Coe,' the supreme court implied that when an asset is
purchased with one spouse's separate property, if that purchased asset
is jointly titled, the separate asset investment is presumed to be a gift
to the marital estate.1 3 In 1990, shortly after the parties' married,
they purchased a home that was titled in both of their names."' The
husband testified that the home was purchased with monies he received
from a personal injury settlement."a During the parties' divorce trial,
the husband argued that because the home was purchased with his
separate assets, it was his separate property. However, the wife argued
the monies received were gifts to the marital unit. 33
The trial court gave the jury the following instructions:
Gifts of property between a husband and a wife during the marriage
do not vest title in the other spouse so as to exclude that property from
being divided in an equitable division of property. And, in that regard,
I will tell you that if the payer of consideration and transferee of the
property are a husband and a wife, a gift shall be presumed, but this
presumption may be rebutted."
The jury verdict stated that the marital home needed to be equally
divided. After the husband's motion for a new trial was denied, he
appealed.'as
The husband argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury
that a gift given during marriage between spouses is subject to equitable
division.1 36 In upholding the trial court's ruling, the supreme court
referred to Lerch v. Lerch, 37 which stands for the proposition "that a
spouse can make a gift of non-marital property to the marital unit,

128. Id. at 808, 692 S.E.2d at 324-25.
129. 285 Ga. 863, 684 S.E.2d 598 (2009).
130. See id. at 864-65, 684 S.E.2d at 600.
131. Id. at 863, 684 S.E.2d at 599.
132. Id. at 864, 684 S.E.2d at 600. There was conflicting testimony on this issue. Id.
The wife denied that the husband's separate monies were used to purchase the house. Id.
at 864-65, 684 S.E.2d at 600.
133. Id. at 864-65, 684 S.E.2d at 600.
134. Id. at 864, 684 S.E.2d at 600.
135. Id. at 863, 684 S.E.2d at 599.
136. Id. at 864, 684 S.E.2d at 600.
137. 278 Ga. 885, 608 S.E.2d 223 (2005).
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which transforms the separate property into marital property, subject to
equitable division.""
However, the ruling in Coe seems to expand the decision in Lerch
because in Lerch the husband recorded and executed a gift deed during
the marriage that transferred property ownership he held prior to the
marriage to both himself and his wife as "tenants in common" with
survivorship rights."a9 In Coe the husband did acknowledge that the
marital home was titled in the name of both parties from its purchase,
but he took no similar affirmative step evidencing his intent to make a
gift of his separate assets to the marital estate.14 o
The ruling in Coe also seems to ignore the decision in Thomas v.
Thomas,' which adopts the source of funds rule as a means to
classify as marital or nonmarital certain property that has characteristics of both. 4 2 As in Coe, in Thomas the issue was each party's
interest in a home that had been purchased with separate assets of one
party. In Thomas the wife purchased the home prior to the marriage
with her separate assets, and the home was titled in the wife's
name." While it was not clear who paid the mortgage in Coe,1" in
Thomas the home had a mortgage balance which had been reduced by
marital funds."
In Thomas the supreme court determined that a spouse's contribution
of separate property entitles that spouse to an interest in the property
in the ratio of the separate property investment to the total separate and
marital investment in the property, with the remaining property
categorized as marital property subject to equitable distribution. 4 1
Thus, the wife retained a separate property interest in the home, and
the home's equity was apportioned between the marital estate and the
wife's separate estate,' whereas in Coe the husband was given no
credit for his separate property investment. 4 '

138. Coe, 285 Ga. at 864, 684 S.E.2d at 600.
139. Lerch, 278 Ga. at 885, 608 S.E.2d at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See Coe, 285 Ga. at 864-65, 684 S.E.2d at 600.
141. 259 Ga. 73, 377 S.E.2d 666 (1989).
142. Id. at 76, 377 S.E.2d at 669.
143. Id. at 73, 377 S.E.2d at 667.
144. See Coe, 285 Ga. at 863, 684 S.E.2d at 599. The opinion implies there was at least
one loan on the home but made no mention of the source of monies used to satisfy that
debt. See id.
145. 259 Ga. at 73, 377 S.E.2d at 667.
146. Id. at 76, 377 S.E.2d at 669 (quoting Harper v. Harper, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (Md.
1982)).
147. See id. at 73, 377 S.E.2d at 667.
148. See 285 Ga. at 865, 684 S.E.2d 600.
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Three cases involving modification of divorce decrees were taken up by
the supreme court during this survey period. In Leggette v. Leggette,"
the supreme court ultimately determined that on remand the trial court
exceeded its authority in modifying the parties' final judgment and
Following the original trial, a divorce decree was
decree of divorce.'
entered between the husband and the wife. The husband appealed, the
verdict was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter was
remanded back to the trial court on the issue of attorney fees.15 '
On remand the trial court considered attorney fees but also "awarded
[the] wife 40[%] of the parties' retirement plans' value as of January 24,
2006," the day the final divorce decree was entered.162 However, the
original decree only "awarded [the] wife 40 percent of the retirement
plans' value, plus or minus the gains or losses on the amount awarded
from the date of the verdict, December 10, 2004," until the funds were
transferred."
After the term in which a final divorce decree is entered, trial courts
no longer have the authority to amend or modify the decree in any
substantive matter or in any way that will affect the merits of the
decree.' Further, when a judgment is affirmed by the supreme court,
"it is error for the trial court to modify the . . . judgment solely upon
consideration of the evidence presented at the previous hearing, or ...
after the expiration of the term [of court] at which the decree was
entered."" The supreme court agreed with the husband, concluding
that the trial court exceeded its power in modifying the original
judgment, and reversed."
In Killingsworth v. Killingsworth,"' the parties divorced in late
2006, and the wife was awarded "one-half (1/2) of the Husband's
retirement account as of November 13, 2006, together with any gains or
losses accruing on said amount subsequent to the hearing.""' Following an evidentiary hearing on December 12, 2008, the former husband

149. 286 Ga. 323, 687 8.E.2d 585 (2009).
150. Id. at 323, 687 S.E.2d at 585-86.
151. Id. at 323, 687 S.E.2d at 585 (citing Leggette v. Leggette, 284 Ga. 432, 668 S.E.2d
251 (2008)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 323-24, 687 S.E.2d at 586.
155. Id. at 324, 687 S.E.2d at 586.
156. Id.
157. 286 Ga. 234, 686 S.E.2d 640 (2009).
158. Id. at 235, 686 S.E.2d at 642 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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was held in contempt of court and ordered to pay his former wife $1850
for her one-half interest in his 401(k).8 9

The husband appealed, arguing that the order was an impermissible
modification of the parties' divorce decree." The supreme court noted
that a trial court may clarify prior judgments or orders or interpret
divorce decrees while resolving contempt issues.1 6' The trial court may
6
also ensure compliance with its decrees.'s
Nonetheless, a trial court
may not "modify the terms of a divorce decree in a contempt proceeding."16 The test is "whether the clarification [or interpretation] is
reasonable or whether it is so contrary to the apparent intention of the
original order as to amount to a modification.,'64
In this case, the trial court transmuted the former wife's award of a
one-half interest in her former husband's 401(k) to a presently due cash
obligation." In reversing the trial court, the supreme court held this
transmutation "was 'so contrary to the apparent intention of the original
order as to amount to a modification.'"1e
A contempt order also arose out of a divorce decree in Darroch v.
Willis.'6 ' The parties' 2007 divorce decree awarded Darroch, the
husband, the marital residence and required Darroch to remove Willis's,
the wife's, name from the marital residence mortgage within thirty days
of remarriage. On August 10, 2008, Darroch remarried but failed to
remove Wilis's name from the mortgage."
On March 6, 2009,
Darroch was held in contempt, and the trial court ordered Darroch "to
purge the contempt either by completing a pending refinancing or by
listing the marital residence for sale and accepting any cash offer for at
least 95% of the list price.""e Darroch appealed, arguing that the
order was an improper modification of the parties' final judgment and
decree of divorce.7 o

159. Id.
160. Id. at 236, 686 S.E.2d at 643.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 297, 637 S.E.2d 716, 718 (2006)).
163. Id.
164. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 297, 637 S.E.2d
716, 718 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 297, 637 S.E.2d 716, 718 (2006)).
167. 286 Ga. 566, 690 S.E.2d 410 (2010).
168. Id. at 566, 690 S.E.2d at 411.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 569, 690 S.E.2d at 413.
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As the supreme court similarly concluded in Killingsworth,"' the
supreme court determined in Darroch that in ordering Darroch to sell
the house he had been awarded pursuant to the final judgment and
decree, the trial court erroneously modified the decree."' The supreme
court reasoned that "in response to willful contempt of a divorce decree,
a trial court has broad discretion to enforce the letter and spirit of the
decree, but the court must do so without modifying the original
judgment that is being enforced."
VII. ADOPTION
7 became effective July 1, 2009.175
The Option of Adoption Actn'
The Act allows for the relinquishment of rights to an embryo and
provides that a child born from such relinquishment shall be the legal
child of the recipient.176 The Act also allows for expedited adoption
prior to or following the birth of the child.177
VIII.

TRUSTS

The issue in Phillips v. Moore"s was whether the corpus of a trust
established by Phillips was part of his bankruptcy estate. In 1996
Phillips created a trust to hold real estate for the benefit of his family
and himself. Per the trust instrument, Phillips received the net income
from the trust during his lifetime, but he did not have the right to the
trust corpus during that period. Phillips did have testamentary power
to appoint the trust property to anyone, including his estate or creditors.
In the event Phillips failed to exercise his power of appointment, specific
beneficiaries of the trust corpus were named in the instrument. The
trust instrument also contained a "spendthrift provision" that protected
both the principal of the trust and income from creditors. 9
In 2007 Phillips filed for bankruptcy. Following a motion by the
bankruptcy trustee, the bankruptcy court held the trust corpus was the
property of the bankruptcy estate.' On appeal, the following question
was certified to the supreme court by the district court:

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See Klingsworth, 286 Ga. at 234, 690 S.E.2d at 642.
Darroch,286 Ga. at 566, 690 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 570, 690 S.E.2d at 414.
O.C.G.A. J§ 19-8-40 to 19-8-43 (2010).
Id.
O.C.G.A. J 19-8-41.
O.C.GA §§19-8-42 to 194-43.
286 Ga. 619, 690 S.E.2d 620 (2010).
Id. at 619, 690 S.E.2d at 621 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.

20101

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

123

Whether a settlor of a trust is a sole beneficiary, such that creditors
may reach the corpus of the trust, when the trust instrument gives the
settlor no right to the corpus during his lifetime but provides him with
a general power to appoint the trust corpus as he sees fit in his will
and names specific beneficiaries to receive the corpus of the trust in the
event that the settlor does not exercise his power of appointment?...
Relying on its decision in Speed v. Speed,182 the supreme court held
the spendthrift provision of the trust was unenforceable." In Speed
the supreme court held that
[t]he invalidity of self-settled spendthrift trusts stems from the idea
that no settlor . should be permitted to put his own assets in a trust,
of which he is the sole beneficiary, and shield those assets with a
spendthrift clause, because to do so is merely shifting the settlor's
assets from one pocket to another, in an attempt to avoid creditors. 8'
In Phillips the supreme court explained that "Speed ... stands for the
proposition that the settlor should not be able to use a power of
appointment to shield his own trust assets from his creditors.""e
Here, Phillips "retain[ed] a general power of appointment enabling him
to dispose of the trust property to anyone, including his estate or his
creditors."'
Thus, he was the sole beneficiary of the trust, and the
The question posed was
spendthrift provision was not enforceable.'
answered in the affirmative.'as

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
263 Ga. 166, 430 S.E.2d 348 (1993).
Phillips, 286 Ga. at 620, 690 S.E.2d at 622.
Id. at 620, 690 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Speed, 263 Ga. at 167, 430 S.E.2d at 349).
Id. at 620, 690 S.E.2d at 622.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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